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Are Latin American military dictatorships able to successfully democratize?
Lauren Welling
ABSTRACT
Latin American countries have faced difficulties in regards to establishing a successful
democracy, as nations have succumbed to military power in the form of dictatorships. This paper
will evaluate the patterns of military dictatorships in Latin America, specifically the rise and fall
of the military junta in Chile. Furthermore, the factors that enabled democratization will be
examined to demonstrate that achieving democracy is possible for Latin American nations.
Democracy is the most popular form of
government across the globe due to its
resounding approval from world powers
such as the United States. However,
achieving a successful democracy in Latin
America has proven to be difficult as most
Latin American nations have succumbed to
military power in the form of dictatorships.
What is the likelihood that Latin American
military dictatorships democratize? I argue
that for military dictatorships to democratize
the military officials that have achieved
power must be publicly opposed by the
citizens, and the military also must consent
to leave their positions of power. In this
paper, I demonstrate that democratization is
possible in countries where authoritarian
regimes exist with evidence that supports the
notion that militaries only do what is in their
best interest when threatened by the
mobilization of citizens opposed to their
authority. The next section reviews the
literature on how others have tried to answer
this question and offers a path forward to
study the concept differently. I then conduct
a case study, or quantitative analysis before
concluding with suggestions for future
research.
Literature Review
According to Barbara Geddes, when the
leader of an autocratic regime loses power,
one of three things can happen, the first
being the incumbent leadership group is
replaced by democratically elected leaders.
Another possibility is that someone from the
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incumbent leadership group replaces him,
and the regime persists. Or, the incumbent
leadership group loses control to a different
group that replaces it. The latter became
rampant in Latin America throughout the
1970s and 1980s in the form of military
dictatorships. Democratic leaders were
being overthrown in coups d’états and were
replaced by military juntas. A military
dictatorship is a regime where power was
obtained through a coup which is typically
enacted with the use of violence against the
preexisting state. The defining feature of the
military dictatorship is that the highest
governmental officials have served (or
continue to serve) in the armed forces and
the governors are primarily dependent on the
support of the officer corps for the retention
of power (Wintrobe). Moreover, the classic
means for a dictator to accumulate and
maintain political power over the citizens is
through political repression (Wintrobe). This
paper will specifically focus on the military
dictatorships in Latin America that have
worked toward democratization, particularly
in the case of Chile.
If a government becomes unstable, it is not
uncommon for citizens to ask their militaries
to intervene and take over the executive
political power in their country. Generally,
when this occurs the military will/place
themselves in power without democratic
processes. This method was prominent in
the Cold War era, especially in Latin
America. The typical attributes of a nation
that was vulnerable to a military coup are a
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weak state authority, imminent foreign
threats, ethnic or sectarian competition for
the control of the executive, natural resource
wealth. Recent wars of independence or
civil wars may also elevate the military to a
prominent political role and thus enhance
capacity for government to intervene
(Svolik). Usually, governments that are
overthrown by militaries are preceded by
eras of turbulence. The issue in Latin
American nations was that they generally
had weak state authorities. The state
authority in Latin America was unable to
support the social demands of their citizens
which ultimately led to dissatisfaction in the
power of the government.
Additionally, in Latin America the challenge
to maintain democracy derives from the fact
that the military power was able to easily
dominate the civilian government
(Rosenberg). In other words, the militaries
in Latin America often had more power than
the governments themselves. This concept is
frequently labeled as the civil military
problematique. In this circumstance, the
relationship between the civilian
government and the military becomes
complicated because without funding for the
military, the security of the nation could be
jeopardized. However, if the weak civilian
government continues to fund the military it
can become a threat to the security of
democracy. The difficulty for countries in
Latin America was giving the military
legitimate power, but also ensuring that it
did not become an internal threat to the
sovereignty of the nation. Governments that
have no power over their military forces are
easier to overthrow. Likewise, in societies
with very high levels of inequality, the
society is more likely to be nondemocratic
(either oligarchic or a military dictatorship).
In these cases, spending more money on the
military would be problematic considering
the government is already in a weakened
environment. Spending more money on the
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military would only serve to weaken the
government as the central power to a larger
extent causing it to be insecure. (Acemoglu,
Ticchi and Vindigni). Furthermore,
economic inequality or ethnic and religious
divisions determine the form and magnitude
of the policy wide political conflict (Svolik).
This was a driving force in Chile as many
people were divided in support or opposition
to the political ideology of Allende.
When militaries acquire a stronghold on
political power there are a variety of reasons
that they maintain power for extended
periods of time. Primarily, the violent
overthrow of a totalitarian government in the
form of a military dictatorship is a vicious
cycle (Tesar and Wilson). The most
common method of attempting to overthrow
governments in power is in the form of
revolution. However, the likelihood of longterm success is rather small if the
“revolutionary” route is attempted (Tesar
and Wilson). Additionally, even if the
revolution is successful, the fall of a dictator
is hardly ever accompanied by the fall of the
dictatorship (Tesar and Wilson). Therefore,
the system in place that the people are in
opposition to does not change in their favor,
despite their efforts.
Repression is the technique used by dictators
to maintain their authority in politics.
Popular restrictions placed on citizens under
military dictatorships are as follows:
restrictions on freedom of press, the rights of
opposition parties to campaign against the
government, and outright prohibition of
groups, associations, or political parties
opposed to the government (Wintrobe). The
common denominator between these
restrictions is that they prohibit the people
from criticizing the government. In the case
of Chile, the military junta exercised their
power by condemning people in society that
openly spoke out against the country’s
leadership. The junta in Chile is known for
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violating human rights during this era by
torturing and imprisoning people that did not
support the new government.
Although repression was an effective
method in oppressing citizens it was not
effective enough to deter citizens from
overthrowing the military governments.
Typically, leaders of military dictatorships
are less likely to survive in office than
leaders of nonmilitary ones (Svolik). This
could be due to the concept that military
dictatorships have a disadvantage at
accumulating political loyalty (Wintrobe).
This is an easy concept to understand as the
military-style regimes are not democratically
elected by the people and the regimes are
known for repressing the rights of citizens.
Countercoups are quite common in military
governments as citizens attempt to win back
power from the nondemocratic regime
(Wintrobe). Countercoups were twice as
likely in a military as in a civilian regime,
and the vast majority of countercoups
involve the overthrow of one military
government and its replacement by another
(Wintrobe). As demonstrated previously,
violent overthrows can start vicious cycles
which only result in another military
government taking power.
The voluntary transfer of power to civilian
regimes has been known to occur, despite
the violence these regimes face (Wintrobe).
Of the 51 military dictators in the world that
transitioned peacefully to a civilian
government, none of them were killed (Ju).
In comparison, 28 out of 203 military
dictators were killed when transitioning
power from one dictator to another (Ju). The
threat of violence against the military regime
ironically leads them to submit to civilianled governments.
Nations in Latin America have been able to
achieve democracy after military authority.
It is argued that after a military regime has
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fallen from power the first issue to be solved
is the solution of what to do with previous
leaders (Rosenberg). In Chile, Pinochet
continued serving in the Chilean military
after his dictatorship came to an end. This
demonstrates the idea that even under
democracy, military leaders remain secure in
the knowledge that their crimes will be
judged in friendly military courts or not at
all after their junta ends because the newly
democratic states are too weak to guarantee
that the juntas will not return to power
(Rosenberg). With the looming power of a
possible reemergence of military authority,
newly appointed democratic leaders have
been known to be lenient in regards to
previous oppressive leaders. Despite being
democratic, nations in Latin America know
they only remain democratic as long as the
military is in support of the democratic
decisions. Rosenberg argues that trials for
previous leaders are crucial for democracy’s
long-term health, but they are seldom
attempted. She uses the example of the three
military uprisings in Argentina that occurred
when Alfonsin, the new democratic leader,
attempted to hold trials for his military
predecessors. The uprisings were enough for
Alfonsin to end the trials. The legacy of
military dictatorships can hamper newly
elected democratic officials if the preceding
regime leaders continue to hold some form
of power in society.
Case Study: Chile
In Chile, the military dictatorship came to
power due to the era of turbulence that
proceded to military takeover. The
opposition to the civil government began
after the election of Salvador Allende; his
government was predominantly Marxist and
they were dedicated to changing the
economic, political, and social structures in
Chile (Valenzuela). Unfortunately, the
Chilean political environment was extremely
polarized and there was a large percentage
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of citizens that wanted Allende out of office
(Valenzuela). Ultimately, the opposition to
Allende’s left wing government resulted in a
coup d’état by the military. However, this
was not without the help of the United States
government which fully endorsed the
overthrow of Allende after the Cold War
era. The external support from a world
power contributed to the military takeover in
the name of containing Communism.
Despite the United States backing of the
Chilean military junta, the turbulent political
era leading up to the assassination of
Allende was the leading cause in the
government overthrow. Citizens throughout
Chile wanted to see Allende out of office
and they frequently tried to impeach him
before resulting to force (Valenzuela). Since
the citizens were unable to overthrow
Allende through political processes, they
turned to their armed forces to intervene in
political affairs. On September 11th, 1973,
General Augusto Pinochet took over
political office from Allende in a bloody
coup d’etat that was supported by the
Chilean citizens, although, assume his
power democratically as he was not elected
through free and fair elections. September
11th, 1973 marked the beginning of the
military junta in Chile.
After the democratic government was
overthrown many people were supportive of
the Pinochet regime. Initially when Pinochet
displaced Allende, people believed that he
would only remain in power until the
economy was stabilized (Devine). People
anticipated that Pinochet would eventually
step down from power and organize
elections for a new president, but instead he
maintained his authoritarian regime for
approximately seventeen years. Chilean
citizens did not mind when the military
remained in power and rounded up people
for interrogations because they feared
extreme leftists (Devine). They believed
Pinochet was reestablishing order and
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eliminating any political threats that
continued to exist after Allende’s demise.
This political climate allowed the Chilean
military to violate human rights through the
use of mass arrests, torture, forced
“disappearances,” and killings (Devine).
Throughout Pinochet’s reign, the Chilean
people became disenchanted with his
authoritarian tactics and wanted to
overthrow him. In fact, there was a
consensus among the citizens that the
president himself had become the chief
obstacle to political normalization, but no
one believed overthrowing him was worth
the risk (Falcoff). Eventually, the majority
of the population in Chile was supportive of
overthrowing the military junta that had
taken over their government
undemocratically.
The mobilization of people against the
Pinochet regime is eventually what led to
the democratization of Chile after the coup.
As people began to reject the coup the
typical layers of an explosive society began
to emerge. Similarly, citizens started to
speak out about the abuses of the
government; as the issues began to become
public information the citizens of Chile
gained the support of external forces.
O’Donnell and Schmitter stated in
Transitions from Military Rule that in
“Chile, important groups within the Catholic
Church rapidly and firmly commit
themselves to those values;” the values they
are discussing are human rights. This is
especially significant because an external
group as important as the Catholic Church
endorsing human rights in a predominantly
Catholic country such as Chile undermines
the power of the military government. The
public lack of support from citizens in Chile
caused the military dictatorship to decide to
democratize the government. People were
the driving force in the military stepping
down from power, but it should be noted
that the military acted in their best interest as
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they were threatened by external groups
such as the Catholic Church and United
States which no longer supported them. The
military leaders in positions of power began
to fear the possibility of a coup against
them, and therefore opted for a peaceful
transition of power. The military stepped
down to ensure their own safety and they
believed if they chose to appease the people
with democratic elections then they might be
able to maintain some form of power. This
action led to their downfall as the military
leaders were not reelected. This conveys the
concept that in circumstances where military

regimes face threats from citizens they will
leave their position of power.
The Chilean junta supports many of the
theories discussed in the literature review.
Furthermore, it is likely that, in the event
that another military dictatorship occurs in
Latin America, it will probably follow the
same process that Chile demonstrated.
Ultimately, it would seem by Chile’s
example that Latin American nations are
able to democratize successfully given that
the military in power steps down.
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